Prelims · objective
CLAT PG 2023 Question Paper with Answers
102 questions. The first 10 questions are free to attempt. All CLAT PG papers
Question 1 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act "from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers" under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide "certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities" from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020. Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: "5. Power to exempt during public emergency. -- In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section `public emergency' means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance." (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below: "... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the `Factories Act' PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, - (1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week. (2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour. (3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM. (4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees)." [Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter `GMS')] Question: Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948 provides for the power of exemption from certain provisions of the Act due to the occurrence of a public emergency. In GMS, the Supreme Court held that: i. Situations of grave emergency require an actual threat to the security of the state. ii. Emergency powers can be used to avert the threat posed by war, external aggression or internal disturbance. iii. Emergency powers must not be used for any other purpose.
- (A) Only i and iii are correct
- (B) Only ii is correct
- (C) Only i and ii are correct
- (D) All the above statements are correct
Answer: (D) All the above statements are correct
Question 2 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: ...If a person enters into a transaction which is surely likely to result in loss, he cannot be accused of insider trading. In other words, the actual gain or loss is immaterial, but the motive for making a gain is essential. The words, "likely to materially affect the price" appearing in the main part of Regulation 2(ha) gain significance for the simple reason that profit motive, if not actual profit should be the motivating factor for a person to indulge in insider trading. This is why the information in Item No.(vii) of the Explanation under Regulation 2(ha) may have to be examined with reference to the words "likely to materially affect the price". Keeping this in mind let us now come back to the facts of the case. Gammon Infrastructure Projects Limited ("GIPL") was awarded a contract for the execution of a project, whose total cost was admittedly 1,648 crores. Simplex Infrastructure Limited ("SIL") was awarded a contract for a project whose cost was 940 crores. Both GIPL and SIL created Special Purpose Vehicles and then they entered into two shareholders Agreements. Under these Agreements, GIPL and SIL will have to make investments in the Special Purpose Vehicles created by each other, in such a manner that each of them will hold 49% equity interest in the other's project. It means that GIPL could have acquired 49% equity interest in the project worth 940 crores and SIL would have acquired 49% equity interest in a project worth 1,648 crore. In arithmetical terms, the acquisition by GIPL, of an equity interest in SIL's project was worth 460 crores approximately. Similarly, the acquisition by SIL, of the equity interest in GIPL's project was worth 807.52 crores. Therefore, the cancellation of the shareholders Agreements resulted in GIPL gaining very hugely in terms of order book value. In such circumstances an ordinary man of prudence would expect an increase in the value of the shares of GIPL and would wait for the market trend to show itself up, if he actually desired to indulge in insider trading. But the respondent did not wait for the information about the market trend, after the information became public. The reason given by him, which is also accepted by the Whole-Time Member ("WTM") and the Tribunal is that he had to dispose of his shares as well as certain other properties for the purpose of honouring a Corporate Debt Restructuring ("CDR") package. It is on record that if the CDR package had not gone through successfully, the parent company of GIPL namely, Gammon India Ltd., could have gone for bankruptcy. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in thinking that the respondent had no motive or intention to make undeserved gains by encashing on the unpublished price sensitive information that he possessed. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal found that the closing price of shares rose, after the disclosure of the information. This shows that the unpublished price sensitive information was such that it was likely to be more beneficial to the shareholders, after the disclosure was made. Any person desirous of indulging in insider trading, would have waited till the information went public, to sell his holdings. The respondent did not do this, obviously on account of a pressing necessity. [Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Ramasubramanian, J., in Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Abhijit Rajan, CA No. 563 of 2020 (hereafter `A Rajan')] Question: What did A Rajan hold regarding the information related to the termination of the shareholders' agreements between GIPL and SIL?
- (A) It was not in the respondent's possession
- (B) It had no impact on the closing price of GIPL's shares
- (C) It was not price sensitive information
- (D) It was price sensitive information
Answer: (D) It was price sensitive information
Question 3 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Food Corporation of India ("FCI" or "Corporation"), the Appellant herein, procures and distributes foodgrains across the length and breadth of the country as a part of its statutory duties. In the process, it enters into many contracts with transport contractors. In one such contract, the subject matter of present appeals, the Corporation empowered itself (under clause XII (a)) to recover damages, losses, charges, costs and other expenses suffered due to the contractors' negligence from the sums payable to them. The short question arising for consideration is whether the demurrages imposed on the Corporation by the Railways can be, in turn, recovered by the Corporation from the contractors as "charges" recoverable under clause XII (a) of the contract. In other words, does contractors' liability for "charges", if any, include demurrages? "XII [Road Transport Contract]. Recovery of losses suffered by the Corporation (a) The Corporation shall be at liberty to reimburse themselves for any damages, losses, charges, costs or expenses suffered or incurred by them, or any amount payable by the Contractor as Liquidated Damages as provided in Clauses X above...." Interpretation of contracts concerns the discernment of the true and correct intention of the parties to it. Words and expressions used in the contract are principal tools to ascertain such intention. While interpreting the words, courts look at the expressions falling for interpretation in the context of other provisions of the contract and also in the context of the contract as a whole. These are intrinsic tools for interpreting a contract. As a principle of interpretation, courts do not resort to materials external to the contract for construing the intention of the parties. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule excluding reference or reliance on external sources to interpret a contract. One such exception is in the case of a latent ambiguity, which cannot be resolved without reference to extrinsic evidence. Latent ambiguity exists when words in a contract appear to be free from ambiguity; however, when they are sought to be applied to a particular context or question, they are amenable to multiple outcomes....". It observed that "....Extrinsic evidence, in cases of latent ambiguity, is admissible both to ascertain where necessary, the meaning of the words used, and to identify the objects to which they are to be applied. The Corporation in the present contract has chosen not to include the power to recover demurrages and as such the expression "charges" cannot be interpreted to include demurrages. Demurrage is undoubtedly a charge, however, such a textual understanding would not help us decipher the true and correct intention of the parties to the present contract". After examining the contract in its entirety, including its nature and scope, the Court concluded that the contractors' liability in the present contract was clearly distinguishable from other contracts entered into by the Corporation in 2010 and 2018, which included loading and unloading of foodgrains from the railway wagons within the scope of contractors' duties, thereby necessitating the inclusion of demurrages as a penalty for non-performance of contractual duties. [Extracted from: Food Corporation of India v. Abhijit Paul, (CA 8572-8573/2022). Judgment of Justices A.S. Bopanna and P.S. Narasimha, 18 November 2022] Question: The Court referred to Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry (1974), to explain that contractual terms cannot be interpreted in isolation, following strict etymological rules or be guided by popular connotation of terms, at variance with the contractual context. This principle of interpretation of contracts is known as
- (A) Ejusdem generis
- (B) Mischief rule
- (C) Literal rule
- (D) Rule of contextual interpretation
Answer: (D) Rule of contextual interpretation
Question 4 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: There are two different ways we can think about law and law-making. To put it crudely: we can think of law as partisan, as nothing more than the expression in legislative terms of the particular ideology or policies of a political party; or we can think of law as neutral, as something that stands above party politics, at least in the sense that once passed it ought to command the obedience and respect of everyone... [Political] Parties compete for control of Parliament because they want their values, their ideology, and their programme to be reflected in the law of the land... ...no-one doubts that the Commons stage is the most important, and the reason surely is that the House of Commons is the institution most subject to popular control. If laws passed by one Parliament turn out to be unpopular, the electorate can install a majority that is sworn to repeal them. That is what elections and representative politics are all about. On this model, it is simply fatuous to pretend that law is somehow `above' politics. Maybe there are some laws on which everyone agrees, no matter what their ideology. Everyone agrees there should be a law against murder, for example, and that there should be basic rules of the road. But as soon as we turn to the fine print, it is surprisingly difficult to find a consensus on the detail of any legislative provision. And in many cases, even the fundamental principles are the subject of fierce political dispute... What this model stresses, then, is that legislative attitudes are necessarily partisan attitudes. So long as there is tight party discipline in Parliament, legislative decisions will be taken on the basis of the ideology of the leadership of the party in power. The partisan model stresses the legitimacy of these attitudes and this form of decision-making... By contrast, what I call `the neutral model' enjoins a certain respect for law and law- making which goes beyond purely partisan views. According to this model there is something special about law, and it carries with it special non-partisan responsibilities. Proponents of the neutral model do not deny that laws are made by party politicians, and that legislation is often motivated by disputed values and ideologies... ...their view is that when a law is being made, something solemn is being decided in Parliament in the name of the whole society. Though it is reasonable for bills to be proposed and debated along partisan lines, the decision procedures of Parliament are designed to indicate not merely which is the stronger party, but what is to be the view of society as a whole on some matter for the time being... ...the result, the outcome, is a decision of the House as a whole: it is, literally, an act of Parliament, not merely an act of the Conservative party or an act of the Labour party, whichever commands the majority. By virtue of the parliamentary process, it transcends partisan politics, and presents itself as a norm enacted for and on behalf of the entire community... ...on the neutral model, the social function idea tends to receive more emphasis than the political provenance. For this reason, the neutral model often focuses on aspects of the legal system that do not involve explicitly partisan initiatives. It focuses on those areas of law where there is something approaching unanimity (such as the fundamental principles of the criminal law and some of the basic tenets of private law). And it focuses particularly on `the common law'. when common law doctrine strikes out in new directions, the change is usually presented as the product of reasoning which is independent of politics, as though there were an evolving `logic' of the law which could proceed untainted by partisan values or ideology. [Excerpted, with edits, from The Law, by Jeremy Waldron, Routledge, Oxon, 1990.] Question: Based on the information provided in the passage, which of the following is the most accurate as regards the Basic Structure doctrine in Indian Constitutional law?
- (A) As it places limits on the amending power of Parliament, it is closer to the partisan rather than the neutral model of law.
- (B) As it emerged from a series of judicial decisions rather than legislation, it is a product of partisan rather than neutral law-making.
- (C) It does not reflect any of the attributes of either the neutral or partisan model of law.
- (D) As it places limits on the amending power of Parliament, it is closer to the neutral rather than the partisan model of law.
Answer: (D) As it places limits on the amending power of Parliament, it is closer to the neutral rather than the partisan model of law.
Question 5 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act "from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers" under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide "certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities" from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020. Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: "5. Power to exempt during public emergency. -- In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section `public emergency' means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance." (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below: "... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the `Factories Act' PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, - (1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week. (2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour. (3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM. (4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees)." [Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter `GMS')] Question: In deciding whether the CoVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdown imposed by the Central Government to contain the spread of the pandemic, have created a public emergency as defined by the explanation to Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948 the Supreme Court in GMS held: i. The economic slowdown caused by the pandemic constitutes a public emergency. ii. The situation created by the CoVID-19 pandemic was similar to a national emergency caused by external aggression or war. iii. The economic slowdown created by the CoVID-19 pandemic qualifies as an internal disturbance threatening the security of the state.
- (A) Only i and iii are correct
- (B) Only ii and iii are correct
- (C) Only i and ii are correct
- (D) None of the above statements are correct
Answer: (D) None of the above statements are correct
Question 6 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. [Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter `Lalita Kumari')] Question: In the case of Pakala Narayanaswami v. King Emperor, 1939 Cri LJ 364 (PC), the Privy Council held that a statement would be a confession if it:
- (A) Admitted the commission of the offence in the terms of the offence.
- (B) Admitted the commission of the ingredients for the commission of the offence.
- (C) Either (A) or (B)
- (D) Both (A) and (B)
Answer: (C) Either (A) or (B)
Question 7 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of "purity and pollution", which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of "purity and pollution", limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of "untouchability", which is based on notions of purity and impurity, "in any form". Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity. [Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] Question: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud's reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates to determine the scope of Article 17 is best explained by this method of constitutional interpretation:
- (A) Living Constitutionalism
- (B) Originalism
- (C) Structuralism
- (D) Textualism
Answer: (B) Originalism
Question 8 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of "purity and pollution", which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of "purity and pollution", limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of "untouchability", which is based on notions of purity and impurity, "in any form". Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity. [Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] Question: Parliament gave effect to Article 17 by enacting:
- (A) The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951
- (B) The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
- (C) The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951
- (D) The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950
Answer: (B) The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
Question 9 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of "purity and pollution", which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of "purity and pollution", limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of "untouchability", which is based on notions of purity and impurity, "in any form". Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity. [Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] Question: In the passage above, what does the term "non-derogable" mean?
- (A) Cannot be extracted under any circumstances
- (B) Cannot be precisely determined
- (C) Cannot be infringed under any circumstances
- (D) None of the above
Answer: (C) Cannot be infringed under any circumstances
Question 10 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. [Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter `Lalita Kumari')] Question: The power of the police to launch an investigation is provided for under Sections 154 and 157 of Cr.P.C. The threshold to be met for launching an investigation under Section 157, according to Lalita Kumari, is
- (A) Cogent and reliable information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence.
- (B) Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term "reason to suspect the commission of an offence".
- (C) Precisely the same standard under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and the police have no discretion in the matter.
- (D) At the same standard as for a non-cognizable complaint being scrutinised by a Judicial Magistrate.
Answer: (B) Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term "reason to suspect the commission of an offence".