Prelims · objective
CLAT PG 2022 Question Paper with Answers
96 questions. The first 10 questions are free to attempt. All CLAT PG papers
Question 1 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Section 304-B (1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) defines `dowry death' of a woman. It provides that `dowry death' is where death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Further, Section 304-B (2) of IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid offence. The Supreme Court of India summarized the law under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) as under: (i) Section 304-B of IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand; (ii) The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of IEA operates against the accused; (iii) The phrase `soon before' as appearing in Section 304-B of IPC cannot be construed to mean `immediately before'. The prosecution must establish existence of `proximate and live link' between the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives and the consequential death of the victim. Question: "The presumption as to dowry death provided under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is a `shall' presumption." The given statement is:
- (A) True.
- (B) False.
- (C) Neither true nor false as the application of the presumption is a matter of discretion of court.
- (D) Neither true nor false as the application of the presumption depends on the facts of the case.
Answer: (A) True.
Question 2 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: The right to clean and healthy environment has been recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 48-A imposes a duty upon the State to endeavour to protect and improve the environment and safeguard the forests and wildlife of the Country. In addition to this, India is also a party to international treaties, agreements and conferences and has committed itself to sustainable development and growth. This legal framework indicates that sustainable development must remain at the heart of any development policy implemented by the state. It is essential to strike the right balance between environmental conservation and protection on one hand, and the right to development on the other, while articulating the doctrine of sustainable development. We may add that in our opinion conservation and development need not be viewed as binaries, but as complementary strategies that weave into one another. In other words, conservation of nature must be viewed as part of development and not as a factor stultifying development. Question: Which of the following provisions contain the fundamental duty to protect and improve the natural environment?
- (A) 51A(h)
- (B) 51A(g)
- (C) 51A(f)
- (D) 51A(d)
Answer: (B) 51A(g)
Question 3 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Sections 31 to 35 of Chapter III of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with contingent contracts and Section 36 deals with contingent agreements. A contingent contract is one where the liability to perform the promise depends upon some collateral event which may or may not happen. A contract of insurance is an example of a contingent contract, where the liability of the insurer depends upon the occurrence of the event, viz. damage or destruction arising out of fire. Life insurance in a broader sense comprises any contract in which one party agrees to pay a given sum upon happening of a particular event contingent upon duration of human life, in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical payments by another. The event may be certain but it's happening in a specific manner or within a particular time would be uncertain. A contract of indemnity to make good the loss arising out of the conduct of the promisor is a contract contingent upon the act of a party. Such condition may be express or may also be implied into a contract. A contract for storage of potatoes in a cold storage cooling system was held subject to an implied condition that it could be performed only when there was continuous electric supply. But where there is a document embodying the terms of a contract, it is not permissible to imply therein a condition if that will be inconsistent with its express terms. Question: `A' agrees to pay `B' a sum of money if a certain cruise does not return. The cruise is sunk. Based on the given facts, which of the following statement is correct?
- (A) The contract can be enforced when the cruise sinks.
- (B) Sinking of cruise has no relevance for validity of contract.
- (C) The contract cannot be enforced when the cruise sinks.
- (D) The condition is impossible.
Answer: (A) The contract can be enforced when the cruise sinks.
Question 4 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory... International law does not say to a State: "You are entitled to claim territorial waters if you want them". No maritime State can refuse them. International law imposes upon a maritime State, certain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory. In the ninth edition of Oppenheim's International Law, the nationality of ships in the high seas has been referred to in paragraph 287, wherein it has been observed that the legal order on the high seas is based primarily on the rule of International Law which requires every vessel sailing the high seas to possess the nationality of, and to fly the flag of, one State, whereby a vessel and persons on board the vessel are subjected to the law of the State of the flag and in general subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. In paragraph 291 of the aforesaid discourse, the learned author has defined the scope of flag jurisdiction to mean that jurisdiction in the high seas is dependent upon the Maritime Flag under which vessels sail, because no State can extend its territorial jurisdiction to the high seas. Of course, the aforesaid principle is subject to the right of `hot pursuit', which is an exception to the exclusiveness of the flag jurisdiction over ships on the high seas in certain special cases. Question: In which of the following judgments, the Supreme Court of India has opined that "sovereignty is not `given', but it is only asserted"?
- (A) State of Tamil Nadu v. Mariya Anton Vijay, (2015) 9 SCC 294.
- (B) Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 3 SCC 354.
- (C) Republic of Italy through Ambassador v. Union of India, (2013) 4 SCC 721.
- (D) Sabeeha Faikage v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 262.
Answer: (C) Republic of Italy through Ambassador v. Union of India, (2013) 4 SCC 721.
Question 5 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression `arrest' contained therein and also under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). `Arrest' may be classified into two categories, namely, the arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no matter of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of `House Arrest' was deliberated by the court as: "There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view, that in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest." Question: In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court has established that the order of the court to direct house arrest of the arrested person shall be:
- (A) Unconstitutional.
- (B) Within the competence of the court under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- (C) Beyond the competence of the court under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- (D) Discretionary.
Answer: (B) Within the competence of the court under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Question 6 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: The Supreme Court of India has held that the nature of inquiry before the Family Court is, indeed, adjudicatory. It is obliged to resolve the rival claims of the parties and while doing so, it must adhere to the norms prescribed by the statute in that regard and also the foundational principle of fairness of procedure and natural justice. These provisions plainly reveal that the Family Court is expected to follow procedure known to law, which means insist for a formal pleading to be filed by both sides, then frame the issues for determination, record the evidence of the parties to prove the facts asserted by the concerned party and only thereafter, to enter upon determination and render decision thereon by recording the reasons for such decision. For doing this, the Family Court is expected to give notice to the respective parties and provide them sufficient time and opportunity to present their claim in the form of pleadings and evidence before determination of the dispute. Question: The Family Courts Act, 1984 does not apply to which of the following matters?
- (A) Divorce under Hindu Law.
- (B) Nikah as per Muslim Personal Law.
- (C) Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
- (D) Adoption under Hindu Law.
Answer: (D) Adoption under Hindu Law.
Question 7 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Both lawmen and laymen often ask, `What is the law applicable to a given set of facts?' The answers to this question differ depending upon the specific jurisdiction to which the given set of facts is linked. Contrary to this, scholars and students of jurisprudence are likely to ask the general question, viz `What is Law?'. This question on the philosophy and nature of law supposes that law is a distinctive social-political phenomenon with universal characteristics that can be perceived through philosophical analysis. In such a study, the assumption is that law possesses some universal characteristics. An analysis of the philosophy of law can be done for different reasons. Apart from a purely intellectual interest in understanding this complex phenomenon known as law, scholars also study the same as a normative social practice that purports to guide human behaviour, giving rise to reasons for action. The primary challenge of the branch of scholarship known as jurisprudence is based on this `normative, reason-giving aspect of law'. At the same time, we must understand that law is not the only normative realm in any given society. It is one of the many normative standards such as morality, religion, customs and usages, etiquette, self-regulatory standards within a family or corporation etc. So, it is also essential that we study law on the differences and similarities of the same with these normative standards. While discerning these connections and contradictions, legal theories often study the content of the norm apart from giving importance to the source. Generally, theoretical studies on the content such as natural lawyers emphasize values such as fairness, justice, liberty etc., as qualifications for the norms to be called laws. They have argued that laws must be in tune with certain principles of inner morality, such as that laws be general, public, prospective, coherent, clear, stable, and practicable are indispensable to law-making. Whereas theories that give prominence to the sources of the norm, such as enactment/command by political institution/authority, do not always emphasize on the content. Such philosophical analysis of law comprises both explanatory and justificatory aspects. While the explanatory aspect consists of explaining how laws can give rise to reasons and what kinds of reasons are involved. One example of this would be Dworkin's classification of law as concepts, principles and rules. The aspect of justification concerns whether people ought to comply with the law's demands. In other words, it is the attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law and the subjects' reasons for complying with it. Question: A norm cannot become legally valid unless its content is fair and just in accordance to:
- (A) Legal Positivism
- (B) Natural Law
- (C) Historical School
- (D) Sociological School
Answer: (B) Natural Law
Question 8 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: Section 304-B (1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) defines `dowry death' of a woman. It provides that `dowry death' is where death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Further, Section 304-B (2) of IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid offence. The Supreme Court of India summarized the law under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) as under: (i) Section 304-B of IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand; (ii) The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of IEA operates against the accused; (iii) The phrase `soon before' as appearing in Section 304-B of IPC cannot be construed to mean `immediately before'. The prosecution must establish existence of `proximate and live link' between the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives and the consequential death of the victim. Question: Whether the demand for dowry was `soon before' the death of the alleged victim of dowry death for establishing the offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is determined by the court on the basis of:
- (A) The length of time between demand of dowry and death.
- (B) The gravity of demand of dowry, including the existence of burns of injuries inflicted while making such demand.
- (C) The length of marriage of the victim and the accused.
- (D) The totality of circumstances of each case, without relying on any straight jacket formula.
Answer: (D) The totality of circumstances of each case, without relying on any straight jacket formula.
Question 9 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: A thought-provoking book titled `The Morality of Law' by Lon L. Fuller on moral philosophy insists on a distinction between `morality of aspiration' and `morality of duty'. From the view of the morality of aspiration, the human conduct does not bear on mandatory rules but on conceptions of the `Good Life', of `what beseems a human being functioning at his best to human capacities'. Because no law can compel a man to live up to the excellence of which he is capable. But for workable standards of judgment, the morality of duty lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society directed towards certain specific goals must fail of its mark. Because the duty ties it very closely to what is `rationally discoverable' and `objective', as contrasted with the morality of aspiration based on subjectivism. However, moralists may differ as to what range of conduct should fall within the respective spheres of duty and the morality of aspirations. "When we are passing a judgment of moral duty, it seems absurd to say that such a duty can in some way flow directly from knowledge of a situation of fact." As due to the fact that before we conclude `that a duty ought to exist', however well we may understand the facts, by the close connection between understanding a person's ideals, approval and disapproval. Does this mean that duties are rationally discoverable, and a matter of choice, even if not of `ineffable preference'? Presumably not, since when we pass a moral judgment of duty `ought' to exist. It is necessary to distinguish between the accepted morality of a social group and the personal morality of individuals. `Duty' may appear in all of these, but the satisfaction is very often a matter of degree varying from situation to situation. The rule of a morality of duty is necessary for social living. The morality of aspiration provides a general idea of the perfection we ought to acquire it. If we consider the whole range of moral issues, we may imagine a yardstick which begins at the bottom with the most obvious demands of social living and extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspirations. Somewhere along this scale an invisible pointer marks the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excellence begins. The whole field of moral argument is an undeclared war over the location of this pointer. Whom we regard as being moralistic are always trying to inch the pointer upward so as to expand the area of duty and they bludgeon us into a belief that we are duty bound to embrace this pattern of human conduct, instead of making us realize a pattern of life they consider worthy of human nature. Question: Which of the following statements is not true?
- (A) `Morality of duty' is non-obligatory.
- (B) `Morality of duty' is obligatory.
- (C) Rules of `morality of aspiration' are a challenge to human conduct.
- (D) Human excellence is the end of `morality of aspiration'.
Answer: (A) `Morality of duty' is non-obligatory.
Question 10 · Prelims
Read the passage and answer the question. Passage: To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory... International law does not say to a State: "You are entitled to claim territorial waters if you want them". No maritime State can refuse them. International law imposes upon a maritime State, certain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory. In the ninth edition of Oppenheim's International Law, the nationality of ships in the high seas has been referred to in paragraph 287, wherein it has been observed that the legal order on the high seas is based primarily on the rule of International Law which requires every vessel sailing the high seas to possess the nationality of, and to fly the flag of, one State, whereby a vessel and persons on board the vessel are subjected to the law of the State of the flag and in general subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. In paragraph 291 of the aforesaid discourse, the learned author has defined the scope of flag jurisdiction to mean that jurisdiction in the high seas is dependent upon the Maritime Flag under which vessels sail, because no State can extend its territorial jurisdiction to the high seas. Of course, the aforesaid principle is subject to the right of `hot pursuit', which is an exception to the exclusiveness of the flag jurisdiction over ships on the high seas in certain special cases. Question: A Coastal State, subject to the obligations imposed by International Law, has sovereignty over its:
- (A) Territorial waters, the seabed and subsoil underlying such waters, and the air space above them.
- (B) Territorial waters, the seabed and subsoil underlying such waters.
- (C) Territorial waters only.
- (D) Territorial waters and the air space above them.
Answer: (A) Territorial waters, the seabed and subsoil underlying such waters, and the air space above them.