CLAT PG 2020 Question Paper

Question 1

The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (suprA), this Court observed: "310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law..." Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…" The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock's aphorism 'you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?' [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as 'rules', wherein they apply in an 'all or nothing fashion'. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin's view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions.

Which of the following State actions passes the 'Proportionality Test'?

Accepted Answer

A slowdown of the internet speed in a State, affecting the Right of Free speech and expression and trade, business and occupation.

Answer

A complete internet ban for an indefinite period in a state affected by terrorism, insurgency and local militia.

Answer

House arrest of eminent political leaders for an indefinite period.

Answer

A complete lockdown in an area affected by militant attacks for an indefinite period.

Question 2

The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (suprA), this Court observed: "310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law..." Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…" The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock's aphorism 'you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?' [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as 'rules', wherein they apply in an 'all or nothing fashion'. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin's view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions.

In the above passage, the Court expresses the limitations on application of All or nothing approach to the fundamental rights. Which of the following statements truly explains such limitations?

Accepted Answer

The state may act in derogation of the Fundamental Rights of the people to achieve a higher public good and social equilibrium.

Answer

The application of Part-III is subject to the interest of the majority and it overrides the rights of an individual.

Answer

The Fundamental Rights of citizens are secondary and the authority of State over its citizens are primary and of utmost importance.

Answer

The above approach is suitable only for the American Constitution as no limitation on rights are mentioned in the text of the Constitution.

Question 3

The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (suprA), this Court observed: "310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law..." Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…" The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock's aphorism 'you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?' [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as 'rules', wherein they apply in an 'all or nothing fashion'. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin's view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions.

In which of the following cases the Supreme Court held that Right to Access Internet is protected under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution?

Accepted Answer

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India.

Answer

Irtiqa Iqbal v. Union of India

Answer

Kapil Sibal v. Union of India.

Answer

None of the above.

Question 4

In taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado, which held: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment." While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that: "Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that "every man's house is his castle" and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose". We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of "personal liberty" which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value.

The above passage makes a mention of the judgment delivered by Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar. Which one of the following judgments is in context here?

Accepted Answer

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.

Answer

M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra

Answer

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

Answer

Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India

Question 5

The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (suprA), this Court observed: "310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law..." Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…" The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock's aphorism 'you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?' [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as 'rules', wherein they apply in an 'all or nothing fashion'. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin's view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions.

Who amongst the following can order for suspension of telecom services in a state under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017?

Accepted Answer

The Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Answer

The Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Answer

A District Magistrate, exercising his powers under S.144 of the Cr. P. C.

Answer

The Chief Secretary to the Government of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Question 6

In taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado, which held: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment." While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that: "Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that "every man's house is his castle" and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose". We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of "personal liberty" which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value.

Which of the following is not a tenet of the term "Life" under Article 21 of the Constitution"?

Accepted Answer

Right to Reputation

Answer

Right to Die with Dignity

Answer

Right to Live with Dignity

Answer

Freedom of Sexual Orientation

Question 7

It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under: "I have gone through the judgment of this Hon'ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of "malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack" on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet "has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy". I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for the healthy functioning of the judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen."

Late Arun Jaitely, in Parliament had said that the Supreme Court is destroying the edifice of Parliament brick by brick. Another member responded by saying transparency in judicial appointments is required as half the judges in the country lack integrity. Are these statements Contempt of Court after the Prashant Bhushan 2020 judgment?

Accepted Answer

No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.

Answer

Yes, because MPs are also bound by Contempt law

Answer

No, because MPs are exempted from Contempt law.

Answer

Jaitely can't be punished as he is no more but the other member can be held liable.

Question 8

In taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado, which held: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment." While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that: "Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that "every man's house is his castle" and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose". We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of "personal liberty" which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value.

Which of the following is true in relation to the scope of the newly evolved "Right to Privacy"?

Accepted Answer

The Right to Privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected.

Answer

The majoritarian concept applies to the Constitutional Rights and the Courts must adhere to the majoritarian view.

Answer

One's sexual orientation is undoubtedly not an attribute of privacy.

Answer

Right to Privacy is an unrestricted and inviolable right, outside the fetters of any State action.

Question 9

It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under: "I have gone through the judgment of this Hon'ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of "malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack" on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet "has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy". I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for the healthy functioning of the judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen."

The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent cases relating to the Criminal Contempt of Court?

Accepted Answer

In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.

Answer

The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.

Answer

Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan

Answer

Union of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.

Question 10

It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under: "I have gone through the judgment of this Hon'ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of "malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack" on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet "has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy". I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for the healthy functioning of the judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen."

In which of the following cases did the apex court hold that, "Contempt jurisdiction should not be used by judges to uphold their own dignity…"?

Accepted Answer

P.N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar

Answer

Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan

Answer

A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen

Answer

Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal

Question 11

CLAT PG 2020 Question Paper with Answers