Supreme Court Dismisses Withdrawn Challenge to Punjab and Haryana Bar Council Casual-Vacancy Election

What happened in the Supreme Court

On 29 October 2026, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the process used to fill a casual vacancy in the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh heard the matter brought by advocate Chetan Verma.

The Bench was not inclined to entertain the challenge. Counsel for the petitioner then sought permission to withdraw it, and the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The procedural outcome is important: the Court did not deliver a full merits judgment declaring a new universal rule for every State Bar Council election.

How the vacancy arose

The dispute followed elections to the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana held in March 2026. Verma had contested the election but was not among the successful candidates. He claimed that he had secured the highest number of votes among unsuccessful candidates and had not been eliminated during counting.

One elected member, Minderjeet Yadav, was subsequently recommended for elevation as a judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Verma argued that he should occupy the seat that became vacant, rather than the Bar Council holding a separate election.

His argument depended in part on the timing of the vacancy. According to the petitioner, the electoral process had not been fully completed when the vacancy arose, so the position of an unsuccessful candidate in the earlier count remained relevant.

The Election Tribunal’s decision

Before approaching the Supreme Court, Verma had challenged the vacancy-filling process before Election Tribunal No. 2 at New Delhi. By an order dated 9 October 2026, the Tribunal rejected his request to be declared a member of the Bar Council.

The Tribunal treated the vacant seat as a casual vacancy governed by Rules 45 and 46 of the applicable election rules. It found no provision for automatic induction of the highest unsuccessful candidate merely because a vacancy arose after the original election.

The Tribunal also vacated an interim restraint on filling the seat. This allowed the Bar Council to proceed in accordance with the governing rules and applicable judicial directions. The challenge reaching the Supreme Court was an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Competing positions before the Bench

Verma’s case was that his standing in the original election should have been recognised. That was a claim advanced by the petitioner; it was not a legal entitlement accepted by the Supreme Court.

Advocate Jasbir Singh Malik, appearing for the Bar Council, submitted that a notification dated 5 May 2026 had declared all 23 elected members and that the original election had therefore been completed. On this account, the vacancy arose only after the elected seats had been filled.

The Bar Council further submitted that Rule 45 of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana Election Rules, 1968 governed the subsequent vacancy, and that a separate election had already been conducted to fill it. These details explained why the respondents disputed the claim to automatic succession.

Why the distinction matters for professional bodies

An ordinary election and an election to fill a later casual vacancy may be governed by different provisions. A candidate’s ranking in an earlier count does not necessarily create a continuing right to a seat after the election has concluded. The applicable rules, the date of completion of the original election and the manner in which the vacancy arose are all material.

The case illustrates why lawyers contesting professional-body elections must identify the precise statutory and regulatory route available to them. Section 38 of the Advocates Act provides an appellate route from certain Bar Council of India tribunal decisions, but it does not itself establish who is entitled to occupy a particular vacant seat.

The Supreme Court’s disposition leaves the election challenge without the relief sought. The available account does not establish that the Bench ordered a fresh vote, installed the petitioner or set aside the vacancy election. The operative result is dismissal following withdrawal, with the earlier Tribunal decision and reported vacancy-filling process remaining the relevant background.