Sikkim High Court Upholds Aggravated Sexual Assault Conviction for Two Separate Acts During One Incident

Conviction and sentence affirmed

Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2025, brought by Limbu Manger alias Raju Thapa against his conviction by the Special POCSO Court at Pakyong. The trial court had imposed five years of rigorous imprisonment and a ₹2,000 fine under Section 10, the statutory punishment for aggravated sexual assault. The High Court affirmed that outcome and the recommendation of ₹15,000 compensation for the survivor. The judgment was delivered on 10 September 2026 and reported during the present news window.

The statutory issue

Section 7 of the POCSO Act defines sexual assault by reference to specified physical contact with sexual intent. Section 9(l) treats assault as aggravated when it is committed more than once or repeatedly. The appeal raised whether two separate acts occurring in the course of one episode could count as repeated assault. The High Court held that the provision did not require two different dates or distinct visits. The factual question was whether the prosecution had proved two separate acts of touching with the necessary sexual intent.

Evidence relied on by the Court

The survivor testified that the appellant touched her inappropriately, stepped back after she reacted, and then repeated the touching. She disclosed the incident to her mother, who informed her father; the father lodged a police complaint the next day. The Court found the survivor’s account cogent and consistent on the essential facts. It also considered corroborating disclosures and documentary evidence of age. These findings were made on the trial record, not from any presumption that all allegations in a POCSO prosecution are automatically true.

The defence arguments

The appellant’s counsel pointed to differences between the accounts of the survivor and her parents concerning the manner of touching, whether repetition had been described at the earliest stage, and the precise time of the occurrence. Counsel also challenged proof relating to the birth certificate. The State argued that the evidence established aggravated sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court considered these objections and held that minor discrepancies did not destroy the central narrative accepted by the trial court.

Sexual intent and the statutory presumption

The judge inferred sexual intent from the repeated conduct and the survivor’s reaction after the first act. The Court referred to Section 30 of POCSO, under which a statutory presumption concerning mental state can operate once foundational facts are established. It did not dispense with the prosecution’s obligation to prove those foundational facts. The Court concluded that the survivor’s reliable evidence demonstrated two separate acts and that the appellant had not rebutted the relevant presumption on the record.

Importance of child testimony

The judgment emphasised that a reliable child witness can support a conviction even without medical corroboration of every detail. The Court examined the consistency of the survivor’s account, its prompt disclosure and the supporting evidence. It distinguished minor variations that may arise in recollection from contradictions going to the core of the prosecution case. This is not a general rule that all discrepancies are irrelevant; the assessment remains dependent on the nature and effect of each inconsistency.

Final result and significance

The appeal was dismissed and the minimum five-year sentence under Section 10 remained in place. The ruling clarifies the interpretation of repeated assault under Section 9(l) where two acts are separated within a single incident. It also illustrates the careful relationship between a child’s testimony, sexual intent, statutory presumptions and appellate scrutiny. The judgment identifies the applicable legal test without disclosing the child’s identity.